The Supreme Court’s decision in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party has settled the legal validity of key sections in the Electoral Act 2026, but it does not empower the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to automatically remove candidates whose names have already been published. This interpretation comes from Dr. M. O. Ubani, SAN, a senior advocate and policy analyst, in a detailed review of the ruling.
The court’s judgment in SC/CR/495/2026 reversed a Court of Appeal decision that had declared Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7), and 84(2) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional, thereby restoring their validity. Ubani clarifies, however, that the ruling does not, by itself, empower INEC to remove the names of candidates it has already published.
“The Supreme Court has restored the law,” Ubani states. “The validity of Sections 77 and 84 cannot, by itself, amount to a judicial determination that every candidate whose nomination is alleged to have been conducted in breach of those provisions is automatically disqualified.” In other words, the court validated the statutory requirements but did not examine the specific facts of every nomination conducted under that law.
Court, Not INEC, Decides Disqualifications
The legal framework now centers on how the restored provisions interact with existing processes for contesting nominations. Under Section 29 of the Electoral Act, political parties must submit candidate names to INEC at least 120 days before elections. Once published, a candidate’s eligibility can be challenged through a Federal High Court proceeding.
Ubani points to Section 29(6), which specifies that only a court—not INEC—can issue an order disqualifying a candidate if false information about their eligibility is found. Section 88(2) expressly permits an aspirant who participated in a party primary and complains that the Electoral Act or the party’s guidelines were not complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate to approach the Federal High Court for redress. Where the court finds that the political party failed to comply with the Act in conducting its primaries, Section 88(3) provides that the candidate shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue.
The Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Dingyadi v. INEC (2011) strengthens this position. The court then held that INEC lacks the authority to disqualify candidates on its own; such power belongs to the courts. While the Electoral Act 2026 updates some procedures, Ubani argues the core limitation persists: INEC cannot unilaterally remove candidates after their names appear on the published list.
Strict Deadlines for Pre-Election Legal Challenges
Ubani also addresses the timing of legal challenges. Under Section 285(9) of the Constitution, pre-election disputes must be filed within 14 days of the contested event. If an aspirant misses this deadline, their claim may be barred, even if the Supreme Court later restores the provisions they relied on. The court’s decision alters the legal framework for pending cases but does not revive time-barred claims.
For candidates already published, the process remains unchanged: any challenge must follow the statutory path-through the courts. INEC’s role is confined to election administration, not adjudicating individual nominations.
The analysis leaves one unresolved issue: what happens to pending lawsuits challenging nominations under the now-invalidated Court of Appeal ruling? Ubani acknowledges this as the most complex aspect. A case filed while the Court of Appeal’s decision was in force cannot be dismissed simply because the Supreme Court later reversed it. Instead, courts must determine whether the claimant’s relief aligns with the restored legal provisions, and whether the action was properly timed.
Ubani concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision restores the law but does not change the statutory process for resolving nomination disputes. Section 33 of the Electoral Act 2026 further reinforces this by prohibiting parties from substituting candidates after submission, except in cases of death or withdrawal. The commission cannot, on the strength of the restored provisions alone, remove the names of candidates it has already published. Any such action would require a court order, following the procedures outlined in the Act.
